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Abstract 
Extraordinary amounts of public funds and/or assistance were made available to banks 
since the onset of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Governments worldwide have launched 
a massive bailout package to support banks in distress. Using a probit model, this paper 
investigates the likelihood of bailouts following the financial crisis. Our results lead us to 
conclude that the governance characteristics of banks, specifically the characteristics of 
boards, bank risks, as well as bank-level and country-specific banking sector features, 
explain the likelihood of bailouts in the European banking sector. In particular we find 
that board banking experience, longer directors’ tenure, less busy boards and the existence 
of a corporate governance committee decrease the likelihood of banks participating in a 
bailout programme. Inversely, board independence, credit and liquidity risks increase the 
probability of banks being bailed out. Furthermore, fewer limitations on banking freedom 
and greater openness of the banking sector have a harmful impact on the occurrence of 
bailouts. Our study therefore suggests relevant policy implications, which might help 
supervisors, regulators and other public authorities in avoiding costly bailouts. 
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1. Introduction  
The global financial crisis, starting in 2007, generated numerous public interventions 
into banking systems. Given that the failure of many banks was imminent, governments 
all over the world enacted a variety of rescue plans to prevent wide scale financial 
collapse. Among the many means of government intervention were: (1) direct equity 
injections, providing liquidity support to banks, (2) government guaranteed debt issuance 
programmes and the issuance of guarantees to reassure depositors and (3) purchases of 
distressed assets by the government or, more generally, the provision of mechanisms to 
relieve financial institutions from impaired or “toxic” assets (Breitenfellner and Wagner, 
2010; Grossman and Woll, 2014). Most of the government bailout programmes were a 
mix of distinct means of government interventions. The Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) in the United States (US) was a mix of equity injections and distressed asset 
purchases, while most of the European bailout programmes combined government 
guaranteed debt issuance programmes with direct equity injections (Breitenfellner and 
Wagner, 2010). More specifically, in the European Union (EU) most member states 
provided general guarantees for the whole banking system as well as support for the 
weakest banks, through guarantees on bank liabilities, capital injections, impaired asset 
relief and funding support. State aid to the banking system in each member state had to 
be notified to - and approved by - the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Competition, which aims to ensure that the measures do not distort competition. Since 
October 2008 hundreds of decisions authorising State aid measures were taken. The bulk 
of this aid represented guarantees on liabilities, with recapitalisations being the second 
most used support instrument.1 Support measures have commonly been accompanied by 
restrictions on dividend payments and on executive compensation, requirements for 
regular reporting on banking activity developments, government participation in the 
management of banks and restructuring requirements. 
Based on much of the policy literature on banking crisis, we would expect a larger 
amount of bailouts whenever the banking sector has a relevant position in the economy. 
In particular, as the size of the banking sector become larger, the need for government 
intervention will become more intense (Laeven and Valencia, 2010). Thus, the 
                                                 
1 For detailed information see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html 
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significance of the banking system for the financing of the economy (e.g., the dependence 
of firms on funding provided by banks) is likely to play a role, urging governments to 
intervene. Accordingly, variation in policy responses might be a function of economic 
issues, where the government has little choice but to intervene once the crisis has erupted. 
Moreover, a concentrated banking sector will have more lobbying resources and is more 
likely to have access to the government than a very dispersed one (Grossman and Woll, 
2014).  
Also, in countries “bank-financed”, where capital access depends on the bank credit, 
bankers and entrepreneurs tend to have personal relationships, with tight connections with 
the the government. Therefore, one might expect that close connections between the 
banking sector and the government (or, in other words, between bankers and members of 
the government) would impact on the occurrence of bailouts. The closer their relations 
the more likely are bailouts.  
Additionally, if politicians do have some discretion when designing bailout plans, we 
should see variation across countries according to political factors (Grossman and Woll, 
2014). The political ideology of government might make a difference. Traditionally, 
conservative parties are assumed to have closer relationships with the banking sector and 
financial interests, while left governments should be concerned about the redistributive 
effects of bank rescues (Cioffi and Höpner, 2006). Also, countries with a liberal market 
tradition should refrain from extensive government aid, while more interventionist 
countries should be more proactive (Grossman and Woll, 2014). 
When banks have very serious financial problems, solving them will imply, very 
often, the need for bailouts, which are extremely costly. The enormous magnitude of the 
global financial crisis, illustrated by the unparalleled volume of government support 
packages for the financial system, has highlighted the need for a clear identification of 
the determinants of bailouts in the banking sector. However, the literature lacks a deep 
and detailed analysis of the factors that determine bailouts in the context of the financial 
crisis.  
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. Unlike previous studies that focus on the 
likelihood of financial distress or bankruptcy, which raises the question of defining the 
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requirements, not always consensual, for a firm to be considered in financial distress2 or 
in bankruptcy, in this study, we focus on bailouts, that can be considered a specific status 
in the firm’s life, in the crisis context. So, our sample consists of banks which received 
government assistance, due to their critical financial distress status, in order to avoid the 
stage of bankruptcy. Substantial financial distress effects are incurred well prior to default 
(Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001) and to bailouts. Fich and Slezak (2008) identify the various 
aspects of a firm’s governance structure that affect the probability and the predictability 
of bankruptcy once the firm has entered the state of financial distress. Overall, their 
findings indicate that governance characteristics are associated with the likelihood that 
financially distressed firms become bankrupt. Also, some other studies have found a 
significant relationship between a set of corporate governance attributes and the financial 
distress of firms, such as Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) for Canadian firms, Tsun-Siou and 
Yin-Hua (2004) for Taiwanese firms, Abdullah (2006) for Malaysian firms and Miglani 
et al. (2015) for Australian firms. However, the literature that analyses the determinants 
of the probability of bailouts of banks in the financial crisis, including governance 
mechanisms, either in a cross-country or in a single country context, is to the best of our 
knowledge almost non-existent.3 Bailed-out banks are, by definition, in some sort of 
distress and exhibit high risk (Dam and Koetter, 2012). 
Being the “ultimate centre of control” of a firm (Mizruchi, 1983), the board is 
responsible for its health and survival and thus, for the potential need of a bailout. 
Corporate boards of directors are responsible for different tasks and responsibilities. 
“Among these, and possibly the most critical is the obligation to maintain the firm's 
solvency” (Platt and Platt, 2012, p. 1139). Previous studies have acknowledged that the 
board’s functions of monitoring, advising and providing resources are essential to any 
firm’s survival but they do not devote attention to how board configuration influences the 
probability of bailouts of banks in the financial crisis. So, our first research question is 
whether bank board characteristics prior to the financial crisis affect the likelihood of 
bank bailouts following the crisis. 
The financial crisis has also raised questions related to risk measurement, risk 
                                                 
2 “Different countries have different accounting procedures and rules, and the definition of financial 
distress put forward by different scholars is not always the same” (Geng et al., 2015, p. 236). 
3 The exceptions are the studies of Adams (2012) and Carty and Weiss (2012) both analysing the US Federal 
Government bailout programmes. 
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growth and risk management within financial organisations in general and banks in 
particular. So, our second research question is whether the specific risks levels of banks 
- such as credit risk, liquidity risk and growth risk - before the crisis influence the 
probability of receiving bailouts following the crisis. If this relationship exists then a 
proper and regular assessment/analysis of risk can mitigate or even avoid bank bailouts.  
Finally, our third research question is whether the pre-crisis size of banks, in order 
to analyse the well-known “too-big-to-fail” issue, and the pre-crisis bank capital are 
related to the likelihood of banks being bailed out following the crisis. 
We examine the effect of the board of banks, specific risks levels of banks, size and 
capital of banks capital immediately prior to the financial crisis (2006) on the likelihood 
of bailouts following the crisis (2007 to 2009). Additionally, we include a set of control 
variables: bank-level and country-level control variables. We measure the variables 
before the crisis for two main reasons. First, since the effects of the crisis are 
overwhelming it is crucial to know if, and how, boards, specific risks levels, size and 
capital determine the probability of bank rescue from financial distress, in order to avoid 
bankruptcy, thereby influencing banking stability. For example, it is very useful to be 
aware whether a bank that has more experienced boards when entering the crisis will 
benefit from this greater experience following the crisis. Thus, we attempt to identify, at 
a bank level, early warning indicators of bank bailouts. Second, this approach mitigates 
endogeneity concerns because we use lagged independent variables to explain the 
probability of bailout, which makes it less likely that these variables are jointly 
determined. 
Our study contributes to the ongoing debate regarding appropriate regulatory 
reform in the banking system by shedding light on the extent to which bank-specific 
corporate governance characteristics and in particular the features of the board of banks, 
which is one of the main governance mechanisms, specific risks levels of banks, bank 
size and bank capital have an impact on the likelihood of bailouts and, consequently, on 
the stability/fragility of the banking system. The severity of the financial crisis has 
produced strong pressure in favour of reforming financial regulation. So, by analysing 
the determinants of the likelihood of banks receiving State aid, our study helps public 
authorities in the process of introducting new recommendations, rules and practices, 
namely in their corporate governance codes, in order to prevent or mitigate a collapse in 
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the future and, thus, promote stability. In short, our findings provide useful insights into 
the determinants of the banking sector health in Europe and, thereby, they are helpful in 
assisting banking supervisors and regulators in their task of guaranteeing a stable system.  
Our paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature in four ways. First, unlike 
previous studies that analyse firms’ probability of financial distress or bankruptcy in 
individual countries or groups of countries outside of Europe, we focus on the likelihood 
of bailout occurrence for banks in 17 European countries. We are not interested in 
financial distress per se nor in bankruptcy, but rather in financial distress that due to 
bailouts do not reach the stage of bankruptcy. So, we focus on a specific and different 
dimension of financial distress. Second, our paper adds to the literature that examines the 
influence of the features of the board on bank life as it provides a detailed analysis of the 
impact the characteristics of the board on bailouts. Therefore, it may be useful in the 
process of (re)configuring boards and may assist directors in taking steps that will 
decrease the likelihood of State aid. Third, we also include in our study the examination 
of the role of the specific risks of banks in predicting bailouts, using accounting and 
market measures. So, risk indicators are explicitly incorporated in our model.  
Many banks had to be bailed out by their governments. It is believed that an analysis 
of the factors that led to the problems suffered by banks in Europe will be of enormous 
benefit. First, the findings can help banking authorities in their duty of ensuring a stable 
financial system. Second, the early detection of potential problems is likely to help reduce 
the expected cost of State aid and to decrease the likelihood of the problem spreading 
more widely through the financial system due to banking interconnectedness. Thus, we 
intend to provide an identification of the factors that make banks more prone to being 
bailed out by their governments, helping to predict bank bailouts and permitting the 
development of the necessary steps to avoid them. 
We note that we investigate the determinants of the likelihood of bailouts of 
European banks following the financial crisis in order to answer the question "What is 
behind the bailouts of European banks?” We do not examine the amount of the bailout 
received by banks (e.g. the impact of the characteristics of the board on the amount of 
government assistance provided to banks) for two reasons. The first is that for some banks 
it is not possible to know exactly the amount of aid received but only the maximum 
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amount of aid made available by the government,4 thereby introducing potential errors in 
our analysis. The second is that for some other banks there is no available information on 
the amount of the bailout, either available or used. Thus, we would lose an important 
number of observations (banks), significantly reducing the sample size.  
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 present the literature 
review and the hypotheses development, Section 3 describes the data and methodology, 
Section 4 provides the empirical results and Section 5 provides the conclusion. 
 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The literature which focuses on bailouts in the context of the crisis is practically 
inexistent, therefore we refer several times to the available literature relating to financial 
distress and bankruptcy as a basis for the formulation of our hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Board independence and bailouts 
Board composition critically influences the success of a firm (Hsu and Wu, 2014). 
Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) argue that corporate failure may occur when the 
composition of a board is imbalanced or inadequate. So, incorrect representation of 
independent directors may affect a firm’s ability to survive. For Daily and Dalton (1994b) 
although neither the number of independent directors nor the proportion of such directors 
are associated with bankruptcy, the effect of the interaction between the percentage of 
independent directors and the joint Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/Chairman roles is 
strongly related to bankruptcy. Identically, for Lajili and Zéghal (2010) the proportion of 
independent directors is positively but not significantly associated with the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the three-way interaction term between independence, 
cumulative blockholding and duality structure show a positive and significant 
relationship. Furthermore, Daily and Dalton (1994a) show evidence that bankrupt firms 
have a higher proportion of affiliated directors. The structure-composition interaction 
term (the interaction between CEO/Chairman structure and the proportion of affiliated 
directors) is significant as well. Additionally, Platt and Platt (2012) comparing non-
                                                 
4 For example, for some banks of our sample we only know that the government “provided up to a certain 
amount of capital” but not the exact amount used. 
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bankrupt firms with bankrupt firms conclude that non-bankrupt firms have a higher 
percentage of independent directors. However, more recently, Hsu and Wu (2014) 
examining the effect of board composition on the likelihood of corporate failure in the 
United Kingdom between 1997 and 2010, demonstrate that the likelihood of corporate 
failure is positively related to the proportion of independent directors on boards. 
Concerning financial distress, Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) find that the proportion 
of outside directors is negatively associated with financial distress status. So, boards of 
financially distressed firms have significantly fewer outside members. On the contrary, 
Abdullah (2006), Brédart (2014a), Brédart (2014b) and Miglani et al. (2015) show that 
the impact of board independence on the occurrence of financial distress is not significant. 
In the context of the financial crisis, Adams (2012) compares a set of selected 
governance characteristics in 2007 between sample banks that received bailout money 
from the US government in 2008 and beginning of 2009 (up until April 10, 2009) and 
sample banks that survived until April, 2009 and did not receive bailout money and she 
concludes that banks receiving bailout money had boards that were more independent. 
According to Adams (2012), this suggests that board independence may not necessarily 
be beneficial for banks. Independent directors may not always have the required expertise 
to oversee complex banking firms. Regarding the advisory role of boards, the lack of 
firm-specific knowledge on the part of independent directors may compromise their 
effectiveness and, so, explaining the positive relationship between the incidence of 
bailouts and board independence. The above arguments lead us to the first 
hypothesis (H1): H1: Board independence increases the likelihood of a bank participating 
in a bailout programme following the financial crisis. 
 
2.2 Board size and bailouts 
Board size has a number of implications for the functioning of the board (Chaganti 
et al., 1985).  
Larger boards are less likely to become involved in strategic decision-making process 
(Judge Jr and Zeithaml, 1992) and may not be able to act effectively as a controlling body 
as they may have difficulties in coordinating their efforts, which leaves management 
relatively free to pursue their own goals (Chaganti et al., 1985). From this point of view, 
a small number of board members produces a more effective control mechanism (Jensen, 
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1993). Large boards also may have difficulty building the interpersonal relationships that 
further cohesiveness or maintaining high board effort norms (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) 
due to the potential "social loafing" that exists in large groups (Latané et al., 1979). In 
addition, a smaller board may benefit from its ability to make decisions more quickly and 
avoid time-consuming debates.  
However, a smaller board may more easily be influenced by the CEO and, also, a 
larger board tends to offer a wider range of experience, skills and different views and 
permit the inclusion of multiple perspectives on corporate strategy and operations (Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992; Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Platt and Platt, 2012). Some studies 
support these arguments (Chaganti et al., 1985; Platt and Platt, 2012; Brédart, 2014b). 
Chaganti et al. (1985) find that non-failed retailing firms tend to have bigger boards than 
failed ones and Platt and Platt (2012) indicate that a smaller board is positively associated 
with bankrupt firms. Also, Brédart (2014b) shows a negative association between board 
size and financial distress. Additionally, for Brédart (2014a) the hypothesis which 
suggests that the board size has a negative impact on financial distress probability is 
partially supported by his model. 
In contrast, other studies contradict this evidence. For Simpson and Gleason (1999) 
the number of directors on the board does not appear to impact future financial distress 
and Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) report that there is no significant difference between the 
board size of the financially distressed and healthy firms. Additionally, Lajili and Zéghal 
(2010) and Darrat et al. (2014) report that board size is not significantly associated with 
the likelihood of bankruptcy.  
Some other studies support the advantages of smaller boards (Fich and Slezak, 
2008; Adams, 2012; Salloum and Azoury, 2012). Fich and Slezak (2008) contend that 
distressed firms with smaller boards are more likely to avoid bankruptcy, meaning that 
board size is significantly positively related to the probability of bankruptcy. Also, 
according to Salloum and Azoury (2012) board size and financial distress are positively 
correlated. In the financial crisis, Adams (2012) compares banks that received TARP 
money in 2008 and 2009 to those that did not and concludes that banks with TARP funds 
have larger boards. The second hypothesis (H2) is then stated as follows: H2: Board size 
increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme following the 
financial crisis. 
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2.3 CEO duality and bailouts 
CEO duality has come under renewed scrutiny because of the perceived loss of 
board vigilance and resultant abuse of power. Carty and Weiss (2012) investigate whether 
CEO duality is associated with the receipt of bailout funds by publicly traded banks in 
the US and they do not find evidence that banks with a dual CEO corporate governance 
structure are more likely to participate in the Federal Government’s bailout programmes. 
Consistent with this view, other studies do not find a significant association between 
duality and the probability of financial distress (Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001; Abdullah, 
2006; Miglani et al., 2015).  
However, Daily and Dalton (1994b) have evidenced that bankrupt firms are not 
more likely to be associated with the joint CEO/board structures but firms that are 
simultaneously characterized by joint CEO/Chairman structures and lower proportions of 
independent directors are associated with bankruptcy. Additionally, Lajili and Zéghal 
(2010) note that the duality structure is not a significant governance variable that affects 
the likelihood of bankruptcy, but when combined with board independence and 
cumulative blockholding the impact is positively significant. 
It has been repeatedly emphasised that boards are more effective when one person 
does not simultaneously occupy the positions of CEO and Chairman. Lorsch and MacIver 
(1989, p. 185) specifically suggest that “providing a leader [of the board] separate from 
the CEO could significantly help directors prevent crises, as well as to act swiftly when 
one occurs.” Evidence by Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) supports this idea as they report 
that dominant CEOs are more likely to be associated with firm bankruptcy. Also, other 
studies report that this duality is more prevalent in bankrupt firms (e.g., Daily and Dalton, 
1994a; Darrat et al., 2014). Based on the previous arguments, although not specific and 
directly related to bailouts, we predict the third hypothesis (H3) as follows: H3: Dual CEO 
corporate governance structure increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout 
programme following the financial crisis. 
 
2.4 Board experience and bailouts 
Operations of some firms are more technically demanding, thereby requiring 
specialist knowledge (Darrat et al., 2014) as is the case of banks. Industry expertise equips 
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directors with a deeper understanding of the more complex financial instruments and 
transactions, industry dynamics and regulatory environment. Additionally, boards with 
financial experience have a better comprehension of the more opaque assets and complex 
activities, but financially experienced boards must also be given the right incentives to 
dissuade them from taking excessive risks (Becht et al., 2011). On the one hand, boards 
with significant financial expertise should moderate risk exposure at their financial 
institutions and consequently mitigate or even prevent losses. A more financially 
knowledgeable board can recognise risks that will not pay off or that are unsound for the 
financial stability of the bank and can advise managers on avoiding such risks. On the 
other hand, financial experts on the board might recognise the government guarantee 
offered to banks and, consequently, be encouraged to pursue more risk-taking activities. 
Concerning the financial crisis we expect that financial/banking experience plays a 
key role. An analysis of Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch prior to their collapse shows 
that their boards of directors lacked sufficient financial expertise (Fernandes and Fich, 
2013). Hau and Thum (2009) find evidence that the lack of financial experience of board 
members in German banks was strongly positively related to losses by the banks. In a 
sample of banks bailed out under the TARP, Fernandes and Fich (2013) show that the 
probability of a bailout decreases as experience increases. Overall, the results indicate 
that banks with banking experts on their boards are less likely to be bailed out. So, the 
banking experience of boards is expected to equally be of great relevance concerning the 
probability of bailouts of banks in Europe, providing them monitoring and advisory 
advantages. The fourth hypothesis (H4) is then stated as follows: H4: Supervisory 
directors’ banking experience decreases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout 
programme following the financial crisis. 
 
2.5 Director tenure and bailouts 
The question of dealing with the length of service period or tenure should directly 
impact the way firms are governed (Lajili and Zéghal, 2010). Boards with low tenure lack 
internal knowledge of the firm and industry specific issues and thus, are not as effective 
in decision making as boards with longer tenure (Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011). On 
the other hand, extended tenure may magnify agency problems between insiders and 
outsiders (McNulty et al., 2013). However, Vance (1983) contends that forcing directors 
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to retire leads to a waste of talent and experience. By being allowed to serve more time 
on the board, supervisory directors could gain more intrinsic and precious knowledge 
about the firm’s business environment, products and markets, as well as its financial 
position and growth strategies (Lajili and Zéghal, 2010). This firm-specific knowledge 
obtained over time helps reduce information asymmetry between the board and 
management (Kim et al., 2014).  
In the context of the subprime lending, Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) find that 
the board configuration of the financial institutions that engaged in subprime lending 
were significantly different from those that did not. Specifically, subprime lenders had 
less board tenure.  
Considering the special nature of banks, by extending the tenure on the boards, 
supervisory directors are in a better position to effectively monitor, detect and control 
opportunistic managerial behaviour in a timely manner, as well as to provide valuable 
and appropriate advice, thus potentially avoiding bailouts of banks. Supervisory directors 
with relatively short tenure on the board would be unable to detect signs of the severity 
of the problems, as in the pre-crisis period, and respond in a timely manner to problems 
arising from the activities of the bank on whose board they serve, making it more likely 
to be bailed out. Therefore, we formulate the fifth hypothesis (H5) as follows: H5: The 
longer the supervisory directors have served on the board, the less the likelihood of a bank 
participating in a bailout programme following the financial crisis. 
 
2.6 Board busyness and bailouts 
More recent theoretical and empirical research highlights the importance of busy 
directors for the board process. Nevertheless, there is compelling theory and evidence to 
support competing positions on the governance impact of busy directors. 
The first perspective, referred to as the Reputational Hypothesis, reflects the view 
that busy directors are preferred due to their superior ability as they are familiar with 
different managerial styles and business strategies and also bring a useful network and 
business contacts.  
The second view of the role of busy directors, called Busyness Hypothesis, asserts 
that serving on multiple boards overcommits a director, which results in the director 
becoming too busy to adequately monitor management or, otherwise, shirking their 
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governance responsibilities. The point behind the problem of busy directors is that, the 
busier a director is, the less effort he/she devotes to each of his/her tasks. So, multiple 
board appointments can adversely affect a board’s decision-making effectiveness. 
However, according to the Reputational Hypothesis the directors who are considered 
“busy” or “extremely busy” are chosen to be on so many boards precisely because of their 
high ability, which serves to offset the effect of their insufficient time. Muller-Kahle and 
Lewellyn (2011) provide evidence that effort levels by board members decrease when 
directors serve on several boards. Thus, busy directors will not be able to devote sufficient 
effort to any one board, which provides support for the Busyness Hypothesis. Elloumi and 
Gueyié (2001) show that the likelihood of financial distress increases as outside directors 
hold more directorships. This result is consistent with the view that additional 
directorships held by outside directors distract these directors from their monitoring 
responsibilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of financial distress. In the same way, 
Berberich and Niu (2011) document a positive relationship between director busyness 
and the likelihood of encountering governance problems, which suggests that holding too 
many board appointments has a detrimental effect on corporate governance. Further, 
Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) find a positive relationship between busy outside 
directors and subprime lending. Thus, subprime lenders had boards that were busier. 
Decisions by financial institutions to engage heavily in subprime lending may have arisen 
from the board being busy with the tasks of others firms, consequently lacking time and 
motivation to put in the effort required to provide significant and proper strategic 
guidance. “Thus, firms with busy boards are more likely to suffer from ineffective group 
decision making that could lead to financial firms choosing to take part in subprime 
lending” (Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011, p. 448) and, thereby, to participate in a 
bailout programme. In accordance with previous studies we expect to confirm the 
Busyness Hypothesis. Accordingly, we state the sixth hypothesis (H6) as follows: H6: 
Busier supervisory directors on the board increase the likelihood of a bank participating 
in a bailout programme. 
 
2.7 Bank specific risks and bailouts 
The financial crisis has led to a further growing awareness and need for appropriate 
risk analysis in its different components. In quantitative risk management, the focus lies 
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on how to enhance the measurement and management of specific risks such as liquidity 
risk, credit risk and market risk (Aebi et al., 2012). Bank soundness can be affected by 
different sources of risk, such as credit risk and liquidity risk (Poghosyan and Čihak, 
2011) and so we examine whether, and how, various bank specific risks affect the 
likelihood of being bailed out. If there is a relationship, then regular monitoring of risk 
and early detection of related potential problems may help to prevent/mitigate 
government assistance. In order to capture bank specific risks, (i.e. credit risk, liquidity 
risk and growth risk of the equity markets), indicators from the balance sheets of banks 
and from the market are used.  
For Davis and Karim (2008) a symptom of banking crises is increased credit risk 
or the probability that a borrower will default, converting an asset into a “bad” or non-
performing loan (NPL). “Although banks enjoy advantages in screening and monitoring 
borrowers, both of which reduce credit risk, the high levels of NPLs associated with crises 
indicate risk assessment by banks deteriorates during pre-crisis periods” (Davis and 
Karim, 2008, p. 93). Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2012) find that a higher proportion of NPLs 
increases the probability of observed distressed Shareholder Value Ratio. Similarly, 
Mayes and Stremmel (2012) show that NPLs positively influence the likelihood of bank 
distress. Also, Dam and Koetter (2012) show that credit risk is associated with a higher 
expected bailout probability. Thus, the seventh hypothesis and the first related to bank 
specific risks (H7.1) is the stated as follows: H7.1: Credit risk increases the likelihood of a 
bank participating in a bailout programme. 
 
Banks need liquidity to meet deposit withdrawals and satisfy customer loan 
demand. Liquidity risk at banks can be defined as the likelihood that the demand for cash 
by bank customers exceeds the bank’s ready supply of cash (DeYoung and Jang, 2015). 
Liquidity risk arises from the inability of a bank to accommodate decreases in liabilities 
or to fund increases in assets (Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012). Banks need to have 
sufficient liquidity assets to avoid incurring a high liquidity risk. This ensures that 
immediate funds will be available at the lowest cost. According to the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, BCBS (2008, p. 1), “liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund 
increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without incurring 
unacceptable losses. Mayes and Stremmel (2012), using as measure of liquidity the loan-
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to-deposit ratio find that the lack of liquidity influences positively the likelihood of bank 
distress. Additionally, to control for liquidity risk Dam and Koetter (2012) use the sum 
of cash and overnight interbank assets to total assets and conclude that liquidity is not 
significant in explaining the probability of bank bailouts during 1995-2006.  
In the context of the financial crisis and in accordance with the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, BCBS (2008), which emphasises the importance of liquidity to 
the functioning of financial markets and the banking sector, as well as the need for 
adequate risk management, the seventh hypothesis and the second related to bank specific 
risks (H7.2) is stated as follows: H7.2: Liquidity risk increases the likelihood of a bank 
participating in a bailout programme. 
 
Finally, we analyse the growth risk measured by market-to-book ratio. Since book 
value does not include future growth potential but market value does, the ratio of the 
market value to the book value is expected to be higher for a firm that is perceived to 
have many growth opportunities (Ramezani et al., 2002). Therefore, the deviation of 
market value from book value depends on the expected growth opportunities and so, it 
reflects investor expectations regarding the future growth of the firm. Market-to-book 
ratio is considered a good proxy for the presence of profitable growth options (Ramezani 
et al., 2002), measuring the market‘s perception of the firm (Rose and Thomsen, 2004). 
Therefore, it may also be used as a proxy for growth risk. Higher market-to-book ratios 
may signal aggressive and riskier strategies to support a higher market evaluation of the 
growth opportunities materialized, for example, in the loosening of lending and other 
banking activity standards. In other words, as more growth opportunities are available, 
banks have stronger incentives to pursue riskier strategies in order to exploit those 
opportunities to compete. In fact, the top management of high-growth firms would need 
to make strategic and riskier decisions to stay competitive (Bathala and Rao, 1995). Since 
the market-to-book ratio is a standard measure in the literature to proxy for growth 
opportunities (Linck et al., 2008), banks with more growth opportunities have higher 
market-to-book ratio, which reflect higher risk. Thus, the market to book ratio is used as 
a measure of growth risk. Accordingly, the seventh hypothesis and the third related to 
bank specific risks (H7.3) is stated as follows: H7.3: Growth risk increases the likelihood 
of a bank participating in a bailout programme. 
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2.8 Bank size and bailouts 
Large banks have received generous sums of government money and other support 
measures in order to keep them afloat, given their looming insolvency. “The argument 
for such policy intervention is that some banks are of a size (and with so important 
interconnections with other banks) that gives them system-wide relevance” (Rötheli, 
2010, p. 123). The failure of a large financial institution will have ramifications for other 
financial institutions and therefore the risk to the economy would be enormous (Helwege, 
2010). For Panageas (2010) governments sponsored bailouts given that some of the 
financial institutions were considered “too-big-to-fail”. On the one hand, public bailouts 
become necessary because the collapse of large banks can impose substantial costs on the 
real economy. On the other hand, government support of "too-big-to-fail" financial 
institutions during the crisis provided incontestable proof that these institutions benefit 
from large explicit and implicit public subsidies, including the expectation that they will 
receive similar public support during future emergencies (Wilmarth Jr., 2011). In this 
way, public bailouts can create moral hazard problems. Banks have an incentive to grow 
to a size that, in case of misfortune, ensures that they are saved (Stern and Feldman, 2004).  
Fernandes and Fich (2013) find that the probability of a bank being bailed out 
increases as its size increases. This result is in accordance with the commonly held view 
that many banks were bailed out because they were deemed “too-big-to-fail” by 
regulators. Large banks are likely to play a greater role in a country´s economic 
performance and thus may be more likely to receive bailouts. Thus, the eighth hypothesis 
(H8) is formulated as follows: H8: Bank size increases the likelihood of a bank 
participating in a bailout programme. 
 
2.9 Bank capital and bailouts 
Public requirement for more bank capital tends to be greater after financial crises 
and reform proposals usually focus on how capital regulation should adapt to prevent 
future crises (Berger and Bouwman, 2013).  
In the Basel framework bank capital is a main variable for ensuring healthy banks. 
Also, many theories suggest that capital improves a bank’s survival probability. On the 
one hand, bank capital serves as a cushion to absorb losses and shocks (Rahman et al., 
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2004; Repullo, 2004; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011). A higher level of capital acts as a 
buffer against financial losses, protecting a bank’s solvency, and is expected to decrease 
the probability of a bank failure (Rahman et al., 2004; Betz et al., 2014). On the other 
hand, bank capital has a direct positive effect on monitoring incentive, as well as reducing 
the probability of default (Mehran and Thakor, 2011). Additionally, a stronger capital 
base attenuates the excessive risk-taking incentives. 
Cole and White (2012) use proxies for the CAMELS indicators5 to explain banking 
failures in the recent financial crisis and they find that capital is one of the factors that 
explains bank failures during 2009. Berger et al. (2012) analyse the role of corporate 
governance on US commercial bank failures during the financial crisis and also find that 
larger amounts of capital decrease the probability of default. Finally, Berger and 
Bouwman (2013) show that having more capital increases the probability of survival of 
small banks at all times and of medium and large banks during banking a crisis. According 
with the arguments presented above, the ninth hypothesis (H9) is formulated as follows: 
H9: Bank capital level decreases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout 
programme. 
 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Sample and data sources 
The 72 banks in our sample corresponds to those that actually meet the cumulative 
selection criteria of (i) being publicly listed at the end of December 2005 that is, listed, at 
least, for the whole of 2006 (so, at least one complete year before the beginning of 2007) 
and not delisted during the crisis period, (ii) with common shares traded on a regulated 
market and that are not a subsidiary of a bank already included in the sample so as to 
prevent duplication of data, and (iii) that are covered by BoardEx, our data source on 
board information. Given the existence of a number of missing observations in some of 
the variables and the fact that the omitted variables are different between banks, this led 
                                                 
5  CAMELS is an acronym for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and 
sensitivity to market risk that is used by bank supervisors. 
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to the usage of a smaller number of observations which can further vary according to each 
model specification. 
In our analysis we are interested in troubled banks receiving different types of State 
assistance (recapitalisation, guarantees or other aid) from their national government so as 
to avoid failure or dissolution. To identify such banks we use various sources of 
information.  
Our first source is the European Commission website, in which we run detailed 
searches on the individual banks. We combine this source with two other sources: the 
annual reports and other documents available on the bank’s official website. Additionally, 
we conduct keyword Google searches using a combination of: (1) the name of each bank 
in our sample, (2) the terms “bailout”, “bailed out”, “rescue”, “capital injection”, 
“recapitalisation”, “guarantee” or “aid” and (3) the words “government” or “State.” Based 
on all these searches, we create a bank bailout dummy variable equal to one if there is at 
least one reference to “bailout” for the particular bank during the interval 2007- 2009.6 
We are interested in whether a specific bank is bailout out, not in the total number of 
bailouts. More specifically, the distribution of the number of bailouts in each year is as 
follows: 1 bailout in 2007, 20 bailouts in 2008 and 25 bailouts in 2009. There were 19 
banks that were bailed out once, 12 banks that were bailed out twice and 1 bank that was 
bailed out three times. 
Further, concerning independent and control variables, data has been extracted from 
several other sources: BoardEx, Datastream, Thomson Financial, annual reports, World 
Bank and Heritage Foundation websites.  
 
3.2 Variables description 
 
3.2.1 Bailout variable 
A dichotomous qualitative dependent variable is used in this study, which we call 
Bank bailout. Bank bailout is a binary variable taking the value of one for a bailed-out 
bank and zero otherwise. 
 
                                                 
6 The results of our study are unchanged over the period 2007-2011. All banks that received aid in 2010 
and 2011 had already received assistance in the previous period. 
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3.2.2 Board characteristics variables  
Our variables of interest regarding the board of banks are: Board independence, 
Board size, CEO duality, Board experience, Director tenure and Board busyness. Board 
independence is defined as the percentage of independent directors. Board size is defined 
as the total number of directors on the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable with a 
value of one if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Board 
experience is measured as the average years of experience in the banking sector of the 
supervisory directors and Director tenure is measured as the average length of time, stated 
in years, that the supervisory directors have been on the board of the bank. Said 
differently, it is the average number of years that the supervisory directors have served 
on the board of the bank. Finally, Board busyness is measured as the average number of 
board positions (number of directorships) held by supervisory directors.  
 
3.2.3 Risk variables 
We include a set of variables in order to capture various aspects of a bank’s 
vulnerability: Credit risk (or default risk), Liquidity risk and Growth risk. Information 
from the balance sheets of banks as well as the market is used to measure bank specific 
risks.  
Following the literature, we account for credit risk, which is directly linked to asset 
composition (or asset quality as defined in the CAMELS framework) (Simpson and 
Gleason, 1999; Rahman et al., 2004; Männasoo and Mayes, 2009; Berger et al., 2012; 
Dam and Koetter, 2012). According to Rahman et al. (2004) and Dam and Koetter (2012), 
Credit risk is measured using the non-performing loan ratio, calculated as non-performing 
loans to total loans. A high ratio indicates a high probability of a bank being bailed out.  
Liquidity risk reflects the probability that banks will be unable to satisfy the claims 
of depositors. Similarly to Mayes and Stremmel (2012), as proxy for Liquidity risk we 
use the loan-to-deposit ratio, this is, total loans divided by total deposits. A high ratio may 
indicate the lack of liquidity and possible repayment problems for sudden unforeseen 
obligations. We expect a positive sign for the Liquidity risk variable. 
Growth risk is measured by the market-to-book ratio, that is, the ratio of the market 
value to the equity book value. A higher ratio indicates a more favourable market 
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perception and, thus, assessment of the growth options. Therefore, the likelihood of a 
bank being bailed out is lower. 
In a robustness check, we use alternative risk measures. 
 
3.2.4 Other specific variables of banks: size and capital 
Large-scale collapses can impose substantial costs on the real economy, making a 
public bailout inevitable. Thus, large banks may be more likely to receive government 
support when confronted with financial distress. To capture the size of the bank, Bank 
size variable, we use the natural logarithm of market capitalization and alternatively, in a 
robustness check, we use the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Additionally, following several papers, we measure bank capital, Capital variable, 
by the ratio of total equity to total assets. We expect that a higher ratio makes the bank 
more resilient to shocks (such a sudden decline in the value of bank assets), other things 
being equal. Although the risk-weighted capital ratios measures are used in some previous 
studies “they are open to manipulation and provide space for discretion to cover up the 
real condition of the bank” (Mayes and Stremmel, 2012, p. 12). More fragile banks tend 
to manipulate risk-weighted measures, thereby helping to make less clear their true 
position (Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2012). Accordingly, similarly to various other 
studies, 7  we use a non-risk-weighted capital measure. 8  However, alternatively, as a 
robustness check, we re-run our model using as a risk-weighted capital ratio measure the 
capital adequacy ratio Tier 1, which represents the ratio of Tier 1 Capital to total risk-
weighted assets, calculated in accordance with banking regulations and expressed as a 
percentage, obtained directly from Datastream.   
 
3.2.5 Control variables  
 
3.2.5.1 Bank-level indicators 
We consider stock returns from January 2006 to December 2006 (2006 
performance) to account for prior bank performance, institutional ownership 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Curry et al. (2003) and Männasoo and Mayes (2009). 
8 Also, for Mayes and Stremmel (2012, p. 2), “the risk-weighted measures that lie at the heart of the Basel 
system are not the best predictor available” [of bank weakness]. 
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(Institutional ownership) to control for ownership structure and the existence of a 
corporate governance committee (CG committee), which is represented by a dummy 
variable coded as one if the bank has a corporate governance committee and as zero 
otherwise. Institutional ownership is measured as the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors. Additionally, in an alternative version of our baseline model we 
account for the existence of a board audit committee (Audit committee), which is 
represented by a dummy variable coded as one if a separate audit committee is present in 
a particular bank and as zero otherwise. 
 
3.2.5.2 Country-specific banking sector and macroeconomic environment indicators 
Evidence shows that country-level banking sector variables are important 
determinants of a firm’s policies, financial distress, bankruptcy and bailouts, although as 
regards bailouts the literature is far less abundant.  
First, we include Concentration as a control variable. Variables such as the 
concentration of the banking sector are proxies that can give indications on the economic 
importance of the sector and the potential influence of the sector’s lobby (Grossman and 
Woll, 2014). Economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the relationship 
between the concentration and the competitiveness of the banking industry and banking 
system fragility (Beck et al., 2006). Some theoretical arguments support the 
“concentration-stability” view that banking system concentration reduces fragility (Allen 
and Gale, 2000). Concentration enhances market power and increases profits. Higher 
profits provide a “buffer” against adverse shocks, decreasing the probability of bank 
distress. In contrast, alternative arguments support the “concentration-fragility” view that 
a more concentrated banking structure raises bank fragility and so, bank distress (Boyd 
and Nicoló, 2005). Caminal and Matutes (2002) show that less competition can lead to 
less credit rationing, larger loans and a higher probability of failure if loans are subject to 
multiplicative uncertainty. In the same way, Poghosyan and Čihak (2011) show that 
banks operating in more concentrated banking sectors are more likely to experience bank 
distress relative to banks operating in less concentrated markets, using as measure of 
concentration the Herfindahl Index. Advocates of the “concentration-fragility” view also 
argue that policymakers are more concerned about bank failures when there are only a 
few banks. Concentration may reduce competition, increase the market power and 
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political influence of financial conglomerates and cause instability of the financial system 
as banks use their influence to shape banking regulations and policies. Our Concentration 
variable is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction 
of assets held by the five largest banks in each country. 
Second, another relevant country-level banking sector variable relates to the degree 
of international integration. To control for this we include as variable the ratio of 
consolidated foreign claims to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the banks that are 
reporting to Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (Čihák et al., 2012), which we call 
IIBIS. We can, then, evaluate whether bailed out banks were from countries where the 
banking system was more exposed to the international environment. Additionally, in 
order to control for international exposure, and as alternative to the variable IIBIS, we 
also include the foreign presence in domestic banking markets as an additional control 
variable (Foreign). Recent decades have seen an unprecedented degree of globalisation, 
especially in financial services. Banking markets have become increasingly international 
on account of financial liberalisation and overall economic and financial integration 
(Claessens et al., 2001). In many countries, foreign bank presence in terms of numbers 
has increased dramatically between 1995 and 2009 (Claessens and van Horen, 2011). 
Banks have expanded internationally, namely, by establishing foreign subsidiaries and 
branches. The global financial crisis has highlighted that there can be risks associated 
with cross-border banking and foreign bank presence (Claessens and van Horen, 2011). 
In fact, since the onset of the global financial crisis, several papers have pointed out the 
risks of foreign banking for financial stability (Claessens and van Horen, 2011). 
Increasingly foreign bank presence may work as a channel of international shocks 
transmission, increasing the vulnerability of domestic banking markets to the 
international environment. As a measure of foreign bank presence, we consider the 
importance of foreign banks in terms of numbers and not in terms of assets. On the one 
hand, data on banking assets that are held by foreign banks is not available for all the 
countries of our sample, whereas, on the other hand, the number of foreign entrants 
matters rather than their market share (Claessens et al., 2001). So, our measure of the 
degree of foreign participation in domestic banking markets, Foreign, which is a proxy 
of the level of international exposure/integration to foreign banks, is the ratio of the 
number of foreign owned banks to the number of the total banks in an economy. A foreign 
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bank is defined as having at least 50% of its shares owned by foreigners. 
Third, as a macroeconomic environment control variable, similarly to Faccio et al. 
(2006), we include GDP per capita to control for differences in the level of economic 
development across countries. More specifically, our variable GDP per capita is the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Alternativelly, in a robustness check we use the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity.  
 
3.2.5.3 Supervisory and regulatory environment indicators 
Additionally, to control for supervisory and regulatory environment we include two 
variables: Official index and Financial freedom. 
The official supervisory powers index, Official index, measures the degree to which 
the country’s commercial bank supervisory agency has the authority to take specific 
actions. It comprises information on many features of official supervision, including 
elements such as the right of the supervisor to meet with the external auditors, demand 
information from them and take legal action against them for negligence and force a bank 
to change its internal organizational structure. Higher values of the index indicate greater 
power. Data on official supervisory powers was obtained from the third survey of bank 
regulation and supervision carried out by the World Bank, available at the World Bank 
website, and discussed in Barth et al. (2008). 
Financial freedom is an indicator of banking efficiency, as well as a measure of 
independence from government control and interference in the financial sector. It is a 
composite index covering if foreign banks are able to operate freely, the degree to which 
the government influences allocation of credit, how difficult it is to open domestic banks 
and other financial services firms, the extent to which the financial system is regulated, 
the presence of State-owned banks and whether banks are free to provide insurance and 
securities services to customers. Thus, this aggregate financial freedom indicator, 
Financial Freedom, uses data from regulatory restrictions, entry restrictions and State 
ownership. Higher values indicate fewer restrictions on banking freedom and a greater 
openness of the banking system. On the one hand, fewer official impediments to bank 
operations and entry can stimulate efficiency and diversification that fosters stability. On 
the other hand, greater freedom and openness promotes greater international exposures 
which, during a crisis, can serve as a contagion channel. One source of instability in 
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financial systems is the possibility of contagion, in which a small shock that initially 
affects one region or sector or even a few institutions, spreads from bank to bank 
throughout the rest of the system, and then affects the entire economy (Allen and Gale, 
2003), as well as other economies (Eichengreen et al., 2012).  
 
3.2.5.4 Corruption indicator 
Finally, in order to control for differences in perceived corruption across countries, 
we include the variable freedom from corruption, called Freedom corruption. Higher 
values denote lower levels of corruption. Corruption deteriorates freedom by introducing 
insecurity and uncertainty into economic relationships and is a failure of integrity in the 
economic system. Freedom from corruption is expected to promote equitable treatment 
and greater regulatory efficiency. 
There is an overlap between some of the control variables, which are used for 
robustness purposes. Thus, we note these overlaps and we do not include them 
simultaneously in the regressions.  
The definitions of all the variables are detailed in Appendix 1. 
 
3.3 Empirical framework 
In the proposed empirical model the dependent variable is binary (bailed out or not 
bailed out). Therefore, we estimate cross-sectional probit model regressions to determine 
the likelihood of bank bailouts.  
More specifically, in our model the dependent variable 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 is a bailout 
indicator variable equal to one for banks that are bailed out at any time over the interval 
July 2007 to December 2009 and equal to zero otherwise. Thus, 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009] = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑎 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖𝑛 [2007,2009]         (1) 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                 
 
 
We assume that 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗  is an unobserved variable of the 
probability that bank 𝑖 received a bailout in the period between July 2007 and December 
2009 and is a function of the board of the bank, bank specific risks, bank size, bank capital 
and a set of control variables, 𝑋𝑖, so that: 
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𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ + 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009]                           (2) 
where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank, 𝑋𝑖,2006
′  is the vector of explanatory variables of bank 
𝑖 as of December 31, 2006, 𝛽 is the vector of coefficients of the explanatory variables and 
𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009] is the error term. 
 
Specifying equation (2) then, 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,2006+ 𝛽3(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽4(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽5(𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,2006 +  
        + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑖,2006 + 𝛽7(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖,2006 +  
        + 𝛽8(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖,2006 + 𝛽9( 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 )𝑖,2006 + 
        +  𝛽10(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,2006 + 𝛽11(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽12(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,2006 + 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009]                    (3) 
 
We examine the heteroscedasticity using the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and 
heteroscedasticity was not confirmed in our model.9 Also, we estimate the model with 
robust variances-covariances.10 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in our 
analysis.  
                                                 
9 We carry out the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for heteroscedasticity using the artificial regression 
method described in detail by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). We test the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity against the alternative of heteroscedasticity of the form: 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(2𝑍𝐼
′𝛾), where 𝛾 
is an unknown parameter. 
10 So, the standard errors are robust to certain misspecification of the underlying distribution of the binary 
dependent variable. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of each variable by showing mean, median, standard deviation 
(Std. dev.), maximum (Max.) and minimum (Min.). 
Variable # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. 
Board independence (%) 72 41.449 44.097 28.729 95.454 0.000 
Board size (Nº) 72 16.389 15.000 5.700 31.000 6.000 
CEO duality 72 0.069 0.000 0.256 1.000 0.000 
Board experience (years) 72 12.751 10.778 6.509 35.064 3.000 
Director tenure (years) 72 5.286 4.900 1.741 11.700 1.100 
Board busyness (Nº) 72 2.631 2.375 1.011 5.750 1.100 
Credit risk (%) 57 2.127 1.080 3.993 28.920 0.080 
Liquidity risk (%) 68 177.439 157.400 148.217 1186.760 46.320 
Growth risk (%) 72 238.588 209.703 108.612 692.477 47.080 
Bank size (€ bil.) 72 22.727 11.410 29.588 160.442 0.220 
Capital (%) 72 5.480 5.244 2.705 14.672 1.792 
2006 performance (%) 72 25.072 20.836 19.611 93.981 -29.251 
Institutional ownership 
(%) 
69 44.464 44.320 27.001 100.000 0.030 
CG committee 68 0.176 0.000 0.384 1.000 0.000 
Audit committee 69 0.812 1.000 0.394 1.000 0.000 
Concentration (%) 72 80.348 82.283 15.275 100.000 49.460 
IIBIS (%) 72 102.401 73.553 57.191 307.321 58.280 
Foreign (%) 72 22.847 13.000 22.324 90.000 1.000 
GDP per capita (US$) 72 38,304.91 36,472.07 10,794.59 72,959.73 19,820.43 
Official index 72 9.306 8.000 2.499 14.000 5.000 
Financial freedom 72 65.000 70.000 15.291 90.000 50.000 
Freedom corruption 72 73.139 75.000 16.733 97.000 43.000 
Note: Observations vary because of missing data.  
Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
 
As can be noted from Table 1, on average, 41.449% of the directors on the board 
are independent. The board has, on average, 16.389 directors, confirming the existing 
literature that banks have on average larger boards than non-financial firms, and a very 
small proportion of banks (6.9%) have a dual CEO corporate governance structure. 
Concerning board experience, director tenure and board busyness we find that, on 
average, supervisory directors have 12.751 years of experience in the banking sector, 
have served on the board 5.286 years and held 2.631 board positions. One aspect relating 
to bank specific risks that stands out is, with the exception of the credit risk, the high 
dispersion. Bank size is, on average € 22.727 billion11 and the capital ratio is, on average, 
                                                 
11 Due to the quite positively skewed distribution of the Bank size we use the natural logarithm, ln(Bank 
Size), in the regression analysis. 
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5.48%, which is a low value comparatively to the limits of the different components of 
capital imposed in the Basel III framework.12 
Regarding bank-level control variables, the stock returns before the financial crisis 
(2006) are, on average 25.072%, a positive value, although the minimum value is negative 
(-29.251%) and institutional investors own, on average, 44.464% bank shares. Also, 
17.6% of banks have a corporate governance committee, while about 81.2% have an audit 
committee. So, in our sample of banks the existence of an audit committee is more 
common than a corporate governance committee.  
With respect to country-specific control variables, we note that the percentage of 
assets held by the five largest banks is, on average, 80.348%, a higher percentage 
relatively to other studies (e.g., De Nicoló et al. (2004) reports a mean five-firm 
concentration ratio of 57% in 1995, which increased slightly to 60% in 2000). The ratio 
of consolidated foreign claims to GDP of the banks that are reporting to BIS is, on 
average, 102.401% and the percentage of foreign banks among total banks is, on average, 
22.847%. The GDP per capita ranges from a high of US$72,959,73 to a low of 
US$19,820.43 and the mean is US$38,304.91.13 
Furthermore, in our sample, the official supervisory index ranges from a minimum 
of 5 to a maximum of 14, which is also the highest value of the index, and the mean is 
9.306. Financial freedom ranges from a minimum of 50 to a maximum of 90, where the 
highest value of the index is 100, and a mean is 65. Finally, freedom from corruption 
ranges from a minimum of 43 to a maximum of 97, where the highest value of the index 
is 100, and the mean is 73.139. 
To obtain a first impression on potential differences between bailed out and not 
bailed out banks we compare our main variables, underlying to our hypotheses, between 
these two groups of banks. Descriptive statistics and the univariate tests of differences 
between bailed out and not bailed out banks are reported in Table 2. The univariate tests 
                                                 
12 In the Basel III framework, 1) Common Equity Tier 1 must be at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at all 
times, 2) Tier 1 Capital must be at least 6.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times, 3) Total Capital (Tier 1 
Capital plus Tier 2 Capital) must be at least 8.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times and 4) a minimum 
Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2017.  
13 Although we use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in the regression analysis, ln(GDP per capita), 
in Table 1 the GDP per capita is reported. 
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are the t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for the continuous 
variables and the Chi-squared test for the categorical variable. 
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Table 2 – Comparison between bailed out and not bailed out banks  
The table reports a comparison of the main variables used in the paper’s multivariate analysis between bailed out and not bailed out banks. Descriptive statistics and the 
univariate tests of differences between the two groups of banks are presented. 
Variable # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. t-test a) Wilcoxon 
test/Chi-
squared test a) 
Board independence         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 41.971/41.032 46.875/43.651 31.316/26.882 94.736/95.455 0.000/0.000 -0.137 0.380 
Board size         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 17.875/15.200 16.000/15.000 5.890/5.321 31.000/29.000 10.000/6.000 -2.021** 1.745* 
CEO duality         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 0.098/0.050 0.000/0.000 0.296/0.221 1.000/1.000 0.000/0.000 --- 0.527 
Board experience         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 12.722/12.773 10.060/11.298 7.783/5.384 35.064/26.613 3.751/3.000 0.033 0.799 
Director tenure         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 5.053/5.473 4.900/4.900 1.741/2.278 8.100/11.700 1.700/1.100 0.859 0.544 
Board busyness         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 2.840/2.463 2.575/2.325 1.153/0.860 5.750/5.250 1.100/1.450 -1.588 1.303 
Credit risk         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 26/31 3.237/1.197 1.350/0.890 5.696/0.870 28.920/3.420 0.280/0.080 -1.970* 1.210 
Liquidity risk         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/36 186.242/169.614 154.680/157.400 189.402/100.730 656.560/1186.760 64.220/46.320 -0.459 0.197 
Growth risk          
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 230.937/244.708 203.066/223.497 89.938/122.315 422.249/692.477 132.475/47.080 0.532 0.504 
Bank size         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out  32/40 16.518/15.760 16.621/15.837 1.072/1.674 18.390/18.893 14.225/12.305 -2.221** 2.000** 
Capital         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 4.653/6.143 4.416/5.528 1.877/3.083 10.317/14.672 2.08/1.79 2.399** 2.306** 
Note: Observations vary because of missing data.  
Asterisks indicate significance at the1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
a) t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for the continuous variables and the Chi-squared test for the categorical variable (CEO duality).  
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Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics categorised for banks that received bailouts 
between 2007 and 2009 and for banks that did not. Also, Table 2 reports the results of the 
t-test, nonparametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test and Chi-squared test of the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the two subsamples of banks. 
Comparing the results for bailed out and not bailed out banks, and according to the 
mean difference test (t-test), we find that bailed out banks have a larger board, higher 
credit risk, larger size and less capital. The results remain unchanged, with the exception 
of credit risk, according to the median difference tests (Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test and 
Chi-squared test). Since in a univariate setting we do not control for various factors that 
may influence the likelihood of a bank being bailed out, we will forego a detailed analysis 
of the univariate statistics and instead rely on the multivariate regression results to 
interpret the influence of the variables on bank bailouts in greater detail. 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the independent variables. Due 
to the problem of space, given the number of variables, we present the correlation matrix 
in three different panels. Panel A presents the correlation between the main variables 
themselves, Panel B presents the correlation between the main variables and the control 
variables and Panel C presents the correlation between the control variables themselves.  
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Table 3 – Pearson correlation matrix: Panel A 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Board 
independence 
1.000           
2 Board size -0.141 1.000          
3 CEO duality 0.021 -0.084 1.000         
4 Board experience -0.153 0.223 -0.057 1.000        
5 Director tenure 0.091 0.046 0.099 0.193 1.000       
6 Board busyness -0.142 0.376*** -0.034 0.434*** 0.135 1.000      
7 Credit risk -0.011 0.068 0.290** -0.015 -0.154 -0.221 1.000     
8 Liquidity risk -0.017 -0.020 -0.165 0.018 0.280 0.141 -0.263 1.000    
9 Growth risk  0.066 -0.288** 0.077 -0.037 0.130 -0.217 -0.057 -0.100 1.000   
10 Bank size 0.442*** 0.240* 0.097 0.065 -0.056 0.136 -0.037 0.453*** 0.219 1.000  
11 Capital -0176 -0.193 0.153 0.050 0.029 -0.065 0.070 -0.183 -0.025 -0.376*** 1.000 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
 
 
Table 3 – Pearson correlation matrix: Panel B 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
12 2006 performance -0.192 0.038 -0.161 0.415*** 0.030 0.185 0.074 -0.107 0.351*** -0.084 -0.083 
13 Institutional 
ownership 
-0.009 0.094 -0.325** 0.269* 0.125 0.237* -0.104 0.043 -0.064 -0.163 -0.139 
14 CG committee 0.248 -0.050 0.061 0.086 0.276 0.009 -0.020 -0.031 0.168 0.125 -0.088 
15 Audit committee -0.032 -0.053 -0.030 0.024 0.011 -0.109 -0.300** -0.205 0.307** 0.191 -0.306** 
16 Concentration -0.191 -0.083 -0.106 0.099 0.075 0.083 -0.373*** -0.176 0.104 -0.045 -0.256* 
17 IIBIS 0.157 -0.179 -0.154 -0.091 0.015 -0.078 -0.173 -0.188 -0.011 0.081 0.059 
18 Foreign 0.124 -0.016 -0.085 -0.123 0.002 -0.104 0.007 -0.203 0.040 0.166 0.011 
19 GDP per capita 0.051 -0.323** -0.193 -0.303** -0.295** -0.076 -0.279** -0.168 -0.240* 0.046 -0.061 
20 Official index -0.147 -0.073 -0.035 0.277** 0.099 -0.048 -0.114 -0.161 0.269* -0.135 0.108 
21 Financial freedom 0.295** -0.387*** -0.181 -0.174 0.084 -0.221 -0.427*** -0.041 0.124 0.202 -0.131 
22 Freedom 
corruption 
-0.004 -0.209 -0.239* -0.029 -0.085 0.026 -0.534*** 0.049 -0.038 0.133 -0.328** 
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Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
Table 3 – Pearson correlation matrix: Panel C 
 Variables 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12 2006 performance 1.000           
13 Institutional 
ownership 
0.184 1.000          
14 CG committee -0.012 -0.136 1.000         
15 Audit committee -0.042 0.035 0.108 1.000        
16 Concentration 0.011 0.066 0.151 0.742*** 1.000       
17 IIBIS -0.203 0.023 0.281** 0.354*** 0.261* 1.000      
18 Foreign -0.277** 0.099 0.281** 0.337** 0.124 0.878*** 1.000     
19 GDP per capita -0.183 -0.034 -0.214 0.149 0.241* 0.402*** 0.092 1.000    
20 Official index 0.108 -0.126 0.346** 0.416*** 0.455*** 0.453*** 0.304** -0.105 1.000   
21 Financial freedom -0.147 0.100 0.037 0.498*** 0.287** 0.623*** 0.518*** 0.483*** 0.125 1.000  
22 Freedom 
corruption 
-0.007 0.162 -0.052 0.613*** 0.660*** 0.368*** 0.141 0.702*** 0.144 0.684*** 1.000 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in our model. The correlation 
coefficients among all independent variables included in each regression analysis are less, 
in absolute value, than 0.8, 14  that is the threshold beyond which multicollinearity 
problems arise (e.g., Gujarati, 2004). In addition, to double check for any 
multicollinearity issue we also compute the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each 
independent variable. All the VIF values (unreported but available upon request) are 
below the critical value of 10 (e.g., Gujarati, 2004; Asteriou and Hall, 2011), which 
indicate that multicollinearity is not a major problem in the regression analyses. We note 
that, since multicollinearity is mainly an issue involving independent variables in a 
regression rather than the dependent variable or the link function between the independent 
and the dependent variables, the use of available linear regression methods is usually 
applicable in nonlinear regression settings. As Menard (2002, p. 76) points up “because 
the concern is with the relationship among the independent variables, the functional form 
of the model for the dependent variable is irrelevant to the estimation of collinearity.” 
 
4.2 Estimation results on the determinants of bailouts 
In this sub-section we present and analyse the results of the probit regressions which 
test the relationship between the dependent variable Bank bailouts and a set of corporate 
governance variables, bank specific risks, bank capital, bank size and control variables. 
Our goal is to analyse the determinants of the likelihood of bailouts in the European 
banking sector in the context of the global financial crisis. 
Table 4, in Column (1), reports the results of the probit regressions for the baseline 
model. In Columns (2) to (4) we test the robustness of our findings.  
Table 5 reports the results of the baseline model augmented by additional control 
variables. 
                                                 
14 The Pearson correlation between the variables IIBIS and Foreign is higher than 0.8 (specifically 0.878). 
However, and first of all for theoretical reasons explained in the text, these variables are not included 
simultaneously in the regression. 
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Table 4 – Determinants of bailouts 
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the 
European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis. 
Variable (1)  
Baseline Model 
(2) (3) (4) 
Board independence 0.021* 
(0.055) 
0.022** 
(0.044) 
0.026** 
(0.019) 
0.009 
(0.409) 
Board size 0.034 
(0.552) 
0.035 
(0.542) 
0.038 
(0.476) 
0.047 
(0.381) 
CEO duality -0.139 
(0.883) 
2.845** 
(0.013) 
-0.092 
(0.919) 
1.735* 
(0.090) 
Board independence × CEO duality --- 
 
-0.049** 
(0.032) 
--- --- 
Board experience -0.190*** 
(0.002) 
-0.185*** 
(0.002) 
-0.144** 
(0.016) 
-0.201*** 
(0.001) 
Director tenure -0.594*** 
(0.010) 
-0.617*** 
(0.007) 
-0.544** 
(0.020) 
-0.772*** 
(0.001) 
Board busyness 1.328*** 
(0.005) 
1.285*** 
(0.004) 
1.296** 
(0.011) 
1.134*** 
(0.006) 
Credit risk 1.083*** 
(0.000) 
1.080*** 
(0.000) 
1.050*** 
(0.000) 
1.356*** 
(0.005) 
Liquidity risk 0.010** 
(0.013) 
0.010*** 
(0.009) 
0.011*** 
(0.007) 
-0.077** 
(0.019) 
Growth risk -0.001 
(0.969) 
0.002 
(0.957) 
0.001 
(0.970) 
-0.009 
(0.383) 
Bank size 0.210 
(0.497) 
0.203 
(0.504) 
0.018 
(0.952) 
0.102 
(0.704) 
Capital -0.233  
(0.149) 
-0.222  
(0.168) 
-0.249  
(0.134) 
-0.071 
(0.566) 
2006 performance 0.043** 
(0.050) 
0.042* 
(0.055) 
0.053** 
(0.035) 
0.049** 
(0.025) 
Institutional ownership -0.006 
(0.529) 
-0.006 
(0.510) 
-0.017  
(0.172) 
0.007 
(0.486) 
CG committee -2.266*** 
(0.007) 
-2.215*** 
(0.006) 
-1.955** 
(0.023) 
-2.220** 
(0.011) 
Concentration 0.083*** 
(0.002) 
0.086*** 
(0.001) 
0.044*** 
(0.004)  
0.064*** 
(0.002) 
IIBIS 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.000) 
---  0.037*** 
(0.000) 
Foreign --- 
 
--- 0.062*** 
(0.002) 
--- 
GDP per capita -3.513** 
(0.016) 
-3.599** 
(0.013) 
-1.688 
(0.155)  
-7.793*** 
(0.001) 
N 53 53 53 50 
Bailed out/ Not bailed out 23/30 23/30 23/30 22/28 
% correct  83.02 83.02 81.13 84.00 
LR statistics 35.801 
(0.005) 
36.418 
(0.006) 
34.236 
(0.008) 
34.696 
(0.007) 
Pseudo R2  0.493 0.502 0.472 0.506 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 1%  (***), 
5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. 
Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
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4.2.1 The baseline model 
The baseline estimation results, Column (1) in Table 4, show that the coefficient on 
the Board independence variable is positive and statistically significant and thus, board 
independence positively influence the likelihood of a bailout. This confirms 
hypothesis H1 and is consistent with previous studies in the context of the financial crisis 
(Adams, 2012) and related to corporate failure (Hsu and Wu, 2014). Our result suggests 
that independent directors suffer from bank-specific knowledge, which penalises the 
effectiveness of the board and thus, increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a 
bailout programme. The coefficient on the Board size variable, on the contrary, is not 
statistically significant, indicating no association between the board size and the 
probability of bailouts of our sample banks. This finding is consistent with Elloumi and 
Gueyié (2001), Lajili and Zéghal (2010) and Darrat et al. (2014) respectively on financial 
distress and bankrupt firms, but contradicts Adams (2012) who finds that banks that 
received funds from TARP in the US have larger board. In a sample of European banks 
we do not find evidence that larger boards of banks are detrimental and, thereby, increase 
the probability of participating in a bailout programme. Our hypothesis H2 is not 
confirmed. The lack of statistical significance regarding the CEO duality variable 
indicates that separating the positions of CEO and Chairman has no impact on the 
likelihood of a bank being bailed out. Therefore, we do not find support for the hypothesis 
H3. This finding is consistent with previous financial distress studies (Elloumi and 
Gueyié, 2001; Abdullah, 2006; Miglani et al., 2015), bankruptcy studies (Lajili and 
Zéghal, 2010) and the study by Carty and Weiss (2012) which, using a sample of US 
publicly traded banks, shows that banks with a dual CEO structure are not more likely to 
participate in bailout programmes. Thus, results in the European context are in accordance 
with results in the US context. On the contrary, Column (1) in Table 4 reveals that banking 
experience matters and so, we find support for hypothesis H4. The coefficient on the 
Board experience variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that banking 
experience providing a deep and sound knowledge of the complexity, dynamics and 
specificities of the banking activity, as well as a better comprehension of its opaqueness 
and regulatory environment, make it less likely for a bank to be bailed out as found by 
Fernandes and Fich (2013). Thus, banking experience of the board’s supervisory directors 
enables banks to be safer from government assistance. Similarly, the coefficient on the 
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Director tenure variable is negative and statistically significant, confirming hypothesis 
H5. As expected, banks with shorter supervisory directors’ tenure are more likely to need 
State aid. Thus, a bank is better served by longer-standing supervisory directors’, who 
have more bank specific knowledge and are better able to monitor and advise bank 
managers. This finding is also found, for example, by Lajili and Zéghal (2010). The 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on the Board busyness variable indicates 
that busier supervisory directors increase the probability of a bank participating in a 
bailout programme, confirming hypothesis H6. This result provides support for the 
Busyness Hypothesis and the view that the presence of supervisory directors holding too 
many directorships compromises board effectiveness. 
With respect to bank specific risks, the coefficients on the Credit risk and Liquidity 
risk variables are positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient on the Growth 
risk variable is not statistically significant. Thus, the credit and liquidity risks increase the 
likelihood of a bank being bailed out while the growth risk has no impact. These results 
confirm hypotheses H7.1 and H7.2 but not hypothesis H7.3. Consistent with the general 
view, (e.g., Dam and Koetter, 2012), the decline in the quality of banks’ loan portfolios, 
resulting in an increasing proportion of non-performing loans, is associated with a higher 
probability of being bailed out. The larger the proportion of non-performing loans, the 
more likely a bank will participate in a bailout plan. Also, as expected, we find a positive 
sign for the liquidity risk measure in predicting bailouts. So, as the loan-to-deposit ratio 
increases the likelihood of a bank being bailed out increases. This finding is in accordance 
with the existence of benefits associated with liquidity.  
Furthermore, in our sample of cross-country European banks the coefficient on the 
Bank size variable is not statistically significant, which does not confirm hypothesis H8. 
So, our findings do not support the view that individual bank size creates a moral hazard 
problem resulting from the fact that, as banks grow they increase their importance and so 
the probability of being saved. The issue of “too-big-to-fail” is not validated at bank-level 
but is validated at country-level given that the coefficient on the Concentration variable 
is positive and statistically significant. Concentration variable is used as proxy for the 
importance of the banking sector and its potential influence on banking regulations and 
policies. Size of individual banks does not seem to matter, but size (and importance) of 
the banking sector in a country increases the probability of receiving bailouts from 
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government. In contrast to our expectation, the coefficient on the Capital variable is not 
statistically significant. Thus, the capital of banks, in our sample, has no impact on the 
likelihood of bailouts and hypothesis H9 is not confirmed.  
Concerning bank-level control variables, the coefficient on the 2006 performance 
variable is positive and statistically significant and the coefficient on the CG committee 
variable is negative and statistically significant. Our results show that performance before 
the crisis increases the likelihood of bailouts. So, the better-performing banks before the 
crisis are the most likely to be bailed out following the crisis. Also, banks with a corporate 
governance committee are less likely to participate in a bailout programme. On the 
contrary, the coefficient on the Institutional ownership variable is not is not statistically 
significant and thus, institutional investors do not influence the likelihood of bailouts. 
Moreover, we find that country-level variables explain the probability of individual banks 
being bailed out. The coefficients on Concentration and IIBIS variables are both positive 
and statistically significant. In line with the “concentration-fragility” view, (e.g., De 
Nicoló et al., 2004; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011), we find that banks located in more 
concentrated banking sectors are more likely to be bailed out. Furthermore, we provide 
empirical evidence suggesting the importance of the degree of international integration. 
Increasing the international exposure of a country’s banking system increases the 
probability of a bank of that country participating in a bailout programme. Finally, the 
coefficient on the GDP per capita is negative and significant, indicating that banks are 
more likely to be bailed out in poorer countries.  
 
4.2.2 Robustness checks 
To assess the reliability of the baseline results, we employ a set of robustness 
checks, Table 4, Columns (2)-(4).  
While we do not formally hypothesize interactive effects, we now extend our 
research by explicitly modelling a corporate governance interaction term. The underlying 
idea is that, in addition to the effect of various governance variables (taken individually) 
on the likelihood of bailouts, the interaction effect among these variables can help to 
predict bailouts. Encouraged by previous studies in the context of corporate bankruptcy 
(Daily and Dalton, 1994a, 1994b) we test the interaction between board independence 
and CEO duality. This interaction variable is the unweighted multiplication of a bank's 
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proportion of independent directors and dual CEO corporate governance structure. 
Column (2) presents the results when the interaction term among the corporate 
governance variables is included. Interestingly, although board independence and CEO 
duality (taken individually) have a positive impact on the likelihood of bailouts, the two-
way interaction between board independence and CEO duality has a negative impact. Our 
findings do not confirm those of Daily and Dalton (1994a, 1994b), who find a positive 
relationship in the context of bankrupt firms. The introduction of the interaction term 
leaves the results unchanged, with the exception of CEO duality that gains statistical 
significance. 
In column (3) we replace the IIBIS variable in the baseline model with the Foreign 
variable, which is the fraction of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the 
total banks in the country. As result of increasing financial integration, foreign banks have 
become important in domestic financial intermediation (Claessens and van Horen, 2011). 
As there is a potential overlap between both variables we do not include them 
simultaneously in the regressions below. Similarly to the coefficient on the IIBIS variable, 
the coefficient on the Foreign variable is significantly positive. Additionally, our 
qualitative findings with respect to the main explanatory variables remain unchanged and 
with regard to the control variables the differences are negligible, supporting the 
robustness of our results. 
In Column (4) we investigate the sensitivity of the results of our baseline model 
using a different definition of specific risks, bank size, capital, concentration and level of 
economic development. Specifically, we measure: 1) credit risk as the ratio of non-
performing assets to total assets, 2) liquidity risk as the ratio of total deposits to total 
assets, 3) growth risk as the percentage of assets growth in the year immediately prior to 
the financial crisis, 4) bank size as the natural logarithm of total assets, 5) capital as the 
capital adequacy ratio Tier 1, which represents the ratio of Tier 1 Capital to total risk-
weighted assets, 6) concentration in the banking industry as the fraction of assets held by 
the three largest banks in each country and 7) level of economic development as the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita, based on purchasing power parity. Estimation 
results are very similar to the baseline model thus, suggesting that our results are scarcely 
affected by the use of alternative variables. We note that only the coefficient on the Board 
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independence variable loses statistical significance, but the coefficient on the CEO 
duality variable is now statistically significant.  
Additionally, in unreported regression we replicate the estimation in Columns (2) 
and (4) using Foreign variable instead of the IIBIS variable and we arrive at similar 
conclusions. 
 
4.2.3 Introducing additional control variables 
As a new step we augmented the baseline model by introducing additional bank-
level and country-level control variables. First, we want to confirm that our main 
conclusions hold when additional control variables are accounted for. Second, we intend 
to test whether the existence of a board audit committee, the supervision and the 
regulation in the banking sector affect the likelihood of a bank being bailed out. 
Controlling for differences in national policies provides not only a simple robustness test 
but it is also independently valuable as countries implement regulations to promote 
stability. 
Table 5 presents the results. 
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Table 5 – Determinants of bailouts with additional control variables 
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the 
European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis, including additional control variables.  
Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Board independence 0.021* 
(0.099) 
0.026** 
(0.040) 
0.014  
(0.130) 
0.024* 
(0.062) 
Board size 0.053 
(0.358) 
0.025 
(0.679) 
0.089  
(0.126) 
0.047 
(0.496) 
CEO duality 0.400 
(0.711) 
-0.496 
(0.609) 
-0.355 
(0.728) 
-0.334 
(0.727) 
Board experience -0.202*** 
(0.001) 
-0.291*** 
(0.000) 
-0.114** 
(0.016) 
-0.196*** 
(0.001) 
Director tenure -0.639*** 
(0.006) 
-0.703*** 
(0.001) 
-0.450*** 
(0.002) 
-0.609*** 
(0.005) 
Board busyness 1.252*** 
(0.009) 
1.692*** 
(0.000) 
1.079** 
(0.000) 
1.390*** 
(0.002) 
Credit risk 1.127*** 
(0.001) 
1.320*** 
(0.000) 
1.053*** 
(0.000) 
1.256*** 
(0.001) 
Liquidity risk 0.010** 
(0.019) 
0.012** 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.122) 
0.011** 
(0.030) 
Growth risk 0.004 
(0.380) 
-0.004 
(0.381) 
0.003 
(0.363) 
0.001 
(0.910) 
Bank size 0.243 
(0.445) 
0.541 
(0.149)  
-0.046 
(0.860) 
0.154 
(0.654) 
Capital -0.296* 
(0.089) 
-0.248  
(0.170)  
-0.031 
(0.800) 
-0.213  
(0.177)  
2006 performance 0.031 
(0.194)  
0.055  
(0.170)  
0.016 
(0.426) 
0.041* 
(0.065) 
Institutional ownership 0.001 
(0.928) 
8.99E-05 
(0.993) 
-0.008 
(0.500) 
-0.011 
(0.394) 
CG committee -2.861*** 
(0.001) 
-3.322** 
(0.002) 
-0.289 
(0.694) 
-2.270*** 
(0.009) 
Audit committee -2.055** 
(0.037) 
--- --- --- 
Concentration 0.115*** 
(0.000) 
0.098*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.007) 
0.076*** 
(0.008) 
IIBIS 0.036*** 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.001) 
--- 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
GDP per capita -3.768*** 
(0.008) 
-4.182*** 
(0.003) 
-4.755* 
(0.099) 
-4.372** 
(0.003) 
Official index --- 0.244 
(0.221) 
--- --- 
Financial freedom --- --- 0.059*** 
(0.010) 
--- 
Freedom corruption --- --- --- 0.030 
(0.459) 
N 53 53 53 53 
Bailed out/ Not bailed out 23/30 23/30 23/30 23/30 
% correct 84.91 84.91 77.36 83.02 
LR statistics 37.907 
(0.004) 
37.327 
(0.005) 
28.906 
(0.035) 
36.213 
(0.007) 
Pseudo R2  0.523 0.515 0.398 0.499 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 
5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. 
Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
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In Table 5, Column (1), to account for the impact of the existence of a separate audit 
committee, we also include the Audit committee variable, which is a dummy variable with 
a value of one if the bank has an audit committee and zero otherwise. We conclude that, 
similarly to Miglani et al. (2015), the coefficient on the Audit committee variable is 
negative and statistically significant. The existence of an audit committee, as well as the 
existence of a corporate governance committee, decreases the likelihood of bailouts. This 
finding is consistent with the argument of Forker (1992) that the presence of an audit 
committee enhances board monitoring quality and attenuates agency costs. We note that 
the coefficient on the Capital variable is, now, negative and statistically significant. 
Next we account for differences in bank supervision and regulation. In Column (2), 
we add to our baseline model the official supervisory powers index, Official index 
variable, which is an index of the power of the country’s commercial bank supervisory 
agency. We find that the coefficient on the Official index variable is not statistically 
significant and that our results are robust to the introduction of this additional control 
variable.  
Further, alternatively, in Column (3), we include the variable Financial freedom, 
which is an indicator of the general openness and regulatory framework as it contains 
elements like openness to foreign competition and the extent of government regulation of 
financial services. Also, we note the potential overlap between the IIBIS and the Financial 
freedom variables, yet we do not include them at the same time. The results are not very 
different from the baseline model. Regarding our main variables, the coefficients on the 
Board independence and Liquidity risk variables are now not statistically significant. 
Also, we find that the coefficient on the Financial freedom variable is positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that fewer restrictions on banking freedom and greater 
openness increase the likelihood of bailouts. Thus, our results suggest detrimental effects 
of financial freedom. Banks are able to operate more freely and to engage in different and 
risky activities, far beyond their core activities. Also, the data points to the presence of 
contagion effects.  
Lastly, in Column (4), we check the extent to which our results might be driven by 
corruption differences in countries. The estimation results corroborate our findings for 
the baseline specification. Also, the coefficient on the Freedom corruption variable is not 
 42 
significant at the conventional levels. Thus, as Faccio et al. (2006), the level of corruption 
is not statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of a bailout.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Governments intervened massively and repeatedly to support banks during the 
financial crisis in order to ensure their survival. Due to the uniqueness of banks and their 
impact on the stability of the financial system, several rescue programmes were adopted. 
Given the tremendous and costly bailout packages worldwide, the analysis of the 
determinants of the likelihood of banks being bailed out is of the utmost importance, 
namely in the process of reforming the financial regulation, the weaknesses of which were 
revealed by the global financial crisis. The results of our study therefore have relevant 
public policy implications. Overall, our results show that a set of characteristics of the 
board, bank risks and control variables have predictive power in explaining the 
probability of bailouts. Specifically, banks with more experienced boards, longer tenure 
and less busy supervisory directors are less likely to be bailed out. So, strong emphasis 
should be placed on the analysis of the board of a bank. On the other hand, both credit 
risk and liquidity risk, as well as the country-specific banking sector factors, 
concentration and international exposure, increase the likelihood of a bank participating 
in a bailout programme. These qualitative findings are unchanged in all regressions. Also, 
in the baseline model, board independence, performance prior to the financial crisis, the 
existence of a corporate governance committee and the level of economic development, 
measured by GDP per capita, have predictive power.  
Additionally, we first examine the impact of the existence of an audit committee 
and, second, the impact of the supervisory and regulatory environment variables. We find 
that the existence of an audit committee and the index of financial freedom are, 
respectively, negatively and positively associated with the likelihood of bailouts. These 
findings are consistent with the idea that the presence of an audit committee strengthens 
board monitoring and reduces agency costs and that greater freedom, acting as a 
contagion channel of shocks, has a detrimental effect. 
 
 43 
Appendix 1 – Variables definitions 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Bank bailouts A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is bailed out any time over the 
period from July 2007 to December 2008 and 0 otherwise. 
July 2007 to December 2009 European Comission 
website; Bank’s official 
website; Annual Reports; 
Google website 
Board independence Percentage of independent directors, that is, the number of independent 
board directors on the board divided by board size. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Board size Total number of directors serving on the board of the bank. December 2006 BoardEx 
CEO duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman, 
0 otherwise. 
December 2006 BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Board experience Supervisory directors’ average years of experience in the banking 
sector. To track banking experience we examine each supervisory 
director’s biography as provided in the BoardEx database. First, we 
compute the number of years each supervisory director has worked in 
the banking sector and sum all these years. Second, we divide this total 
by the number of supervisory directors on the board of the bank. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Director tenure Average length of time, stated in years, that the supervisory directors 
have been on the bank’s board. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Board busyness  Average number of board positions (number of directorships) held by 
supervisory directors. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
 
Credit risk Non-performing loan ratio, calculated as non-performing loans to total 
loans; Alternatively, non-performing assets ratio, calculated as non-
performing assets to total assets. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Liquidity risk Loan-to-deposit ratio, that is, total loans divided by total deposits. 
Alternatively, ratio of total deposits to total assets, that is, total deposits 
divided by total assets. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Growth risk Market-to-book ratio, that is, ratio of the market value of equity to the 
book value of equity. Alternatively, percentage of assets growth in the 
year immediately prior to the financial crisis. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Bank size Natural logarithm of the bank’s market capitalisation. Alternatively, 
natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Capital Bank capital, computed as the ratio of total equity to total assets. 
Alternatively, capital adequacy ratio Tier 1, which represents the ratio 
of Tier 1 Capital to total risk-weighted assets, calculated in accordance  
December 2006 Datastream 
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Appendix 1 – Variables definitions (cont.) 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Capital (cont.) with banking regulations and expressed as a percentage December 2006 Datastream 
2006 performance Buy-and-hold stock returns. January 2006 to December 2006 Datastream  
Institutional ownership Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. December 2006 Thomson Financial 
CG committee A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has a corporate governance 
committee, 0 otherwise. 
December 2006 BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Audit committee A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has an audit committee, 
0 otherwise. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Concentration Measure of concentration in the banking industry. Assets of the five 
largest banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. 
Alternatively, assets of the three largest banks as a share of total 
commercial banking assets. 
December 2006 World Bank website15 
IIBIS Measure of the degree of international integration. Ratio of 
consolidated foreign claims to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 
banks that are reporting to Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
December 2006 World Bank website16 
Foreign Percentage of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the 
total banks in an economy. A foreign bank is a bank where at least 50% 
of its shares are owned by foreigners 
December 2006 World Bank website17 
GDP per capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Alternatively, natural logarithm 
of GDP per capita, based on purchasing power parity 
December 2006 World Bank website18 
Official index The official supervisory powers index measures the degree to which 
the country’s commercial bank supervisory agency has the authority to 
take specific actions. It is composed of information on many features  
2007 (revised June 2008)19 World Bank website20; 
Barth et al. (2008) 
                                                 
15 Global Financial Development Database, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development 
16 Global Financial Development Database, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development 
17 Global Financial Development Database, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development 
18 Global Financial Development Database, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development 
19 We use data as close as possible to the financial crisis. 
20 Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision carried out by the World Bank, available at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.h
tml#Survey_III 
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Appendix 1 –Variables definitions (cont.) 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Official index (cont.) of official supervision: 1. Does the supervisory agency have the right 
to meet with external auditors about banks? 2. Are auditors required to 
communicate directly to the supervisory agency about elicit activities, 
fraud, or insider abuse? 3. Can supervisors take legal action against 
external auditors for negligence? 4. Can the supervisory authority force 
a bank to change its internal organisational structure? 5. Are off-
balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory 
agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute 
provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the supervisory 
agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute: a) Dividends? b) 
Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8. Can the supervisory agency 
supersede the rights of bank shareholders-and declare a bank insolvent? 
9. Can the supervisory agency suspend some or all ownership rights? 
10. Can the supervisory agency: a) Supersede shareholder rights? b) 
Remove and replace management? c) Remove and replace directors? 
The official supervisory index has a maximum value of 14 and a 
minimum value of 0, where higher values indicate greater power. 
2007 (revised June 2008) World Bank website; 
Barth et al. (2008) 
 
Financial freedom Indicator of financial and banking freedom specifically, whether 
foreign banks are able to operate freely, whether the government 
influences allocation of credit, how difficult it is to open domestic 
banks and other financial services firms, to which extent the financial 
system is regulated, the presence of State-owned banks and whether 
banks are free to provide insurance and securities services to customers. 
The index ranges from 0 to 100, with high values signifying more 
freedom and thus fewer restrictions. 
December 2006 Heritage Foundation 
website21 
Freedom corruption Indicator of freedom from corruption. Values range from 0 to 100, with 
higher values indicating lower levels of corruption. 
December 2006 Heritage Foundation 
website22 
 
                                                 
21 http://www.heritage.org 
22 http://www.heritage.org 
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